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Something Old, Something New: 
Reflections on the Sex Bureaucracy 
Melissa Murray and Karen Tani* 
This essay responds to “The Sex Bureaucracy,” in which Jacob Gersen 
and Jeannie Suk identify a “bureaucratic turn in sex regulation”—one that has 
expanded the reach of sexual regulation to include “nonviolent, non-harassing, 
voluntary sexual conduct” (or in their words, “ordinary sex”). In their view, 
the Department of Education’s campaign against sexual assault on college 
campuses epitomizes this bureaucratic shift. While applauding the authors’ 
attention to the intersection of sexuality and governance, we challenge their 
account of the “bureaucratic turn” as an unprecedented event. Drawing on 
examples from across U.S. history, we show how administrative agencies and 
unelected bureaucrats have persistently and robustly regulated sex and 
sexuality, including “ordinary sex.” Building on this more historical and 
nuanced portrait of America’s “sex bureaucracy,” we then identify what is 
truly new and striking about the slice that Gersen and Suk explore. In the 
Department of Education’s regulation of sex, we see clearly how consent—and 
specifically, affirmative consent—has replaced marriage as the boundary 
marker between licit and illicit sexual conduct. At a time when marriage no 
longer holds force as the distinguishing feature of lawful sex and sexuality, 
enthusiastic, unambivalent expressions of consent provide the state with 
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documentable signals of appropriate sex and sexuality, while also, we 
speculate, reinforcing an ascendant neoliberal logic of citizenship and 
governance. In short, the “sex bureaucracy” is old, but innovative, and very 
much deserving of our scrutiny. 
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INTRODUCTION 
“We are living in a new sex bureaucracy.” Thus begins Jacob Gersen and 
Jeannie Suk’s important and provocative recent article, in which they describe 
“an elaborate and growing federal bureaucratic structure that,” in practice, 
regulates “ordinary sex.”1 This development disturbs them, and with reason. In 
their telling, the “bureaucratic turn in sex regulation” has produced results that 
are not only deeply intrusive, but also undemocratic and violative of individual 
rights and liberties.2 
In documenting and exploring this “bureaucratic turn,” Gersen and Suk 
draw on a powerful and controversial example: the ongoing campaign by the 
U.S. Department of Education (DOE), via its Office for Civil Rights (OCR), to 
address sexual violence on college campuses3—a serious and well-established 
problem.4 Exercising its authority under Title IX of the Education Amendments 
1. Jacob Gersen & Jeannie Suk, The Sex Bureaucracy, 104 CALIF. L. REV. 881, 883–84 
(2016). 
2. Id. at 883. 
3. Although the DOE’s enforcement of Title IX on college campuses is the authors’ primary 
example, they also see the “sex bureaucracy” at work in the DOE’s regulation of primary and 
secondary schools, and possibly in the “extensive rules about sex in the contexts of the military and 
prison.” Id. at 884 n.7. 
4. See Bonnie S. Fisher, Francis T. Cullen, & Michael G. Turner, The Sexual Victimization of 
College Women, U.S. DEP’T JUST. (December 2000) (finding that of a randomly selected national 
sample of women attending 2- or 4-year colleges or universities during the fall of 1996, 15.5 percent of 
respondents were sexually victimized during a single academic year, with 2.8 percent of respondents 
experiencing completed or attempted rape); Christopher P. Krebs et al., The Campus Sexual Assault 
(CSA) Study, NAT’L INST. JUST. (October 2007) (reporting that of a randomly selected sample of 
undergraduate women at two large public universities, 19 percent of respondents and 26.3 percent of 
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of 1972,5 as well as more recent statutes regarding the disclosure of campus 
crime statistics,6 the DOE has required colleges and universities “to take 
immediate and effective steps to end sexual harassment and sexual violence.”7 
These steps include responding promptly to complaints with a campus-level 
adjudicative apparatus, reporting allegations of sexual misconduct to the 
federal government, and taking proactive measures to prevent sexual violence, 
such as educating community members on the importance and nature of 
consent.8 Should the DOE suspect that an institution has failed to fulfill its 
responsibilities under federal law, it may launch (and publicly announce) a 
formal investigation. Ultimately, it may deny further institutional access to 
federal funds.9 
The effects of these administrative efforts are significant, according to 
Gersen and Suk. The DOE now dictates what procedures and standards of 
evidence schools must use to evaluate allegations of sexual misconduct. These 
procedures and standards do not align with those of the criminal justice 
process—a disconnect that troubles Gersen and Suk.10 The DOE also defines 
what kind of sexual conduct is impermissible, and by implication, Gersen and 
senior respondents reported experiencing completed or attempted sexual assault since entering 
college); David Cantor et al., Report on the AAU Campus Climate Survey on Sexual Assault and 
Sexual Misconduct (September 21, 2015) (reporting that of respondents to a 27-campus survey, 26.1 
percent of senior females, 6.3 percent of senior males, and 29.5 percent of students identifying as 
transgender, genderqueer, nonconforming, questioning or other had experienced “sexual contact 
involving penetration or sexual touching as a result of physical force or incapacitation”). 
5. Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681–88 (2012). 
6. E.g., Clery Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1092(f) (2012), amended by Campus SaVE Act, 20 U.S.C. § 
1092(f) (Supp. II, Vol. 1 2014) (requiring campuses to disclose statistics annually to the Department of 
Education and empowering the Secretary to disseminate this information and coordinate with 
institutions to identify and recommend “exemplary” practices). 
7. OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., DEAR COLLEAGUE LETTER: SEXUAL 
VIOLENCE (Apr. 4, 2011), http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/letters/colleague-201104.pdf. 
8. Gersen & Suk, supra note 1, at 897–98, 909; see also Michelle J. Anderson, Campus 
Sexual Assault Adjudication and Resistance to Reform, 125 YALE L.J. 1940, 1973–75, 1980–81 
(2016) (discussing OCR due process requirements, the evidentiary standard that OCR requires for 
campus proceedings, the steps OCR mandates to protect complainants, and the affirmative consent 
policies that colleges and universities have voluntarily adopted); Susan Hanley Duncan, The Devil Is 
in the Details: Will the Campus SaVE Act Provide More or Less Protection to Victims of Campus 
Assaults?, 40 J.C. & U.L. 443, 447–53 (2014) (detailing campus safety statutes and explicating the 
DOE’s guidance to institutions); Jill C. Engle, Mandatory Reporting of Campus Sexual Assault and 
Domestic Violence: Moving to a Victim-Centric Protocol that Comports with Federal Law, 24 TEMP. 
POL’Y & C.R. L. REV. 401, 402–08 (2015) (surveying the legal reporting requirements imposed on 
college and universities by federal law, including the Clery Act and the SaVE Act); Title IX in 
Detail, KNOW YOUR IX (Sept. 4, 2016), http://knowyourix.org/title-ix/title-ix-in-detail/ (discussing 
requirements of prompt responses to complaints, campus employee training, and victims’ reporting 
options). 
9. Gersen & Suk, supra note 1, at 897–98, 909. On DOE’s investigatory and enforcement 
efforts, see the Chronicle of Higher Education’s excellent database, Title IX: Tracking Sexual Assault 
Investigations, available at http://projects.chronicle.com/titleix/. 
10. Gersen & Suk, The Sex Bureaucracy, supra note 1, at 932–46. 
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Suk argue, what kind of conduct is desirable, with scant attention to the bounds 
of the criminal law.11 And, like an invasive weed, Gersen and Suk maintain, the 
DOE has “plant[ed] seeds of its own replication” within colleges and 
universities, via the requirement that these institutions have their own “mini-
bureaucracies” devoted to the agency’s mission.12 All the while, the DOE has 
insulated itself from public and judicial scrutiny by insisting that these 
developments are in furtherance of a clear and uncontroversial anti-
discrimination mandate.13 
We appreciate and applaud the authors’ detailed analysis of the DOE’s 
efforts, and we hope that the developments they chronicle will attract further 
scholarly attention. We take exception, however, to one of the article’s basic 
assumptions. Gersen and Suk proceed from the premise that the bureaucratic 
regulation of sexuality is not just disturbing and problematic, but also that it is 
unprecedented. Theirs is a story about bureaucracy “creeping into domains one 
would not have thought to be the subject of bureaucratic regulation”14—here, 
the domain of “ordinary sex,” which they define as “nonviolent, non-harassing, 
voluntary sexual conduct.”15 This claim does important work for their 
argument, in that it helps cast their “sex bureaucracy” as un-American and 
illegitimate. 
But how accurate is this claim of novelty? Sex, even what Gersen and Suk 
call “ordinary sex,” has always been regulated.16 Regulation has occurred via 
the punitive apparatus of the criminal law, as Gersen and Suk note,17 as well as 
through the benefits and burdens embodied in family law.18 Most importantly, 
11. Id. at 924–31. 
12. Id. at 905, 907. 
13. Id. at 908–11. 
14. Id. at 884. 
15. Id. at 885. Elsewhere they define “ordinary sex” as “voluntary adult sexual conduct that 
does not harm others.” Id. We find this definition less helpful, as notions of “harm” can be subjective 
determinations. Indeed, applying Gersen and Suk’s definition, some might argue that the DOE is in 
fact only regulating extraordinary sex, because the agency is focusing on conduct where one party to 
the sexual interaction perceives harm, or where the conduct harms women more generally by 
preventing them from enjoying access to education on the same terms as men. 
16. Melissa Murray, Marriage as Punishment, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (2012) (“[T]here was 
little space for sex outside the rubrics of marriage and crime, and no refuge from state regulation of 
sex.”). 
17. Gersen & Suk, supra note 1; see also Melissa Murray, Strange Bedfellows: Criminal Law, 
Family Law, and the Legal Construction of Intimate Life, 94 IOWA L. REV. 1253, 1264–71 (2009) 
(discussing criminal law’s role in regulating intimate life); Murray, supra note 16, at 52 (discussing 
criminal law’s role in regulating sex and sexuality). 
18. See, e.g., PEGGY PASCOE, WHAT COMES NATURALLY: MISCEGENATION LAW AND THE 
MAKING OF RACE IN AMERICA (2009) (discussing civil restrictions on interracial marriage); Adrienne 
L. Davis, The Private Law of Race and Sex: An Antebellum Perspective, 51 STAN. L. REV. 221 (1999) 
(connecting the historical law of intestate succession and testamentary transfers in the South to the 
regulation of sexual relationships between white men and black women); Murray, supra note 17, at 
1264–67 (discussing family law’s regulatory effects); Murray, supra note 16, at 53 (same); Kimberly 
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for the purposes of this Essay, sexual regulation has long occurred via 
administrative agencies and the unelected bureaucrats who staffed them. 
This Essay draws upon history, both distant and more recent, to sketch a 
more complete portrait of America’s sex bureaucracy. We show that 
administrative agencies have routinely regulated sexuality, as they interpreted 
and enforced laws that, like Title IX, were not necessarily part of the criminal 
code—laws dealing with immigration, public health, public benefits, and more. 
We also show how public employers administratively regulated sexuality, via 
internal bureaucratic processes. And, like Gersen and Suk, we note the unequal 
ways in which the sex bureaucracy has figured into the lives of Americans. 
This more complete portrait helps us identify what is distinct about the 
sex bureaucracy’s current iteration. It also positions us to appreciate what is 
most compelling and interesting about the slice of that bureaucracy that Gersen 
and Suk explore. Historically, marriage marked the boundary between licit and 
illicit sexual conduct.19 Focusing on the regulation of sexual violence on 
college campuses, Gersen and Suk have identified a new boundary: consent. 
They have also identified a regulatory preference for a particular species of 
consent: affirmative consent. These vital insights prompt questions that extend 
beyond bureaucracy, to governance, and thereby implicate all Americans, not 
merely the select segment of the population that concerns the DOE. If Gersen 
and Suk are correct and we have shifted to a consent-based system of sexual 
regulation—a system that appears to demand not only consent’s explicit (and 
enthusiastic) articulation but also its documentation for subsequent review by 
the state—what does this say about our broader governing order? 
The Sections that follow elaborate these insights. Drawing on historical 
examples from the fields of immigration, national security, and welfare, Part I 
documents federal administrative regulation of sex and sexuality well before 
the DOE began regulating sex on campus through Title IX. These earlier 
iterations of America’s sex bureaucracy regulated many aspects of intimate 
life, including “ordinary sex.” Building on these examples and drawing on case 
law from the more recent past, Part II evaluates Gersen and Suk’s claim of a 
“bureaucratic turn” in the regulation of sex and sexuality. According to Gersen 
and Suk, the decriminalization of consensual adult sexuality in 2003’s 
Lawrence v. Texas corresponded with a shift in the state’s preferred mode of 
sexual regulation—away from the criminal law and toward the administrative 
state. While we agree with this theory of regulatory displacement, we show that 
Richman, Lovers, Legal Strangers, and Parents: Negotiating Parental and Sexual Identity in Family 
Law, 36 L. & SOC. REV. 285 (2002) (describing family law’s historical commitment to a family form 
anchored in heterosexual marriage and exploring how child custody disputes have shaped and 
redefined the identities of gay and lesbian parents and would-be parents). 
19. Murray, supra note 17, at 1268 (describing marriage’s role in delineating the boundary 
between lawful and unlawful sex). 
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the shift occurred earlier—and in ways that showcase the breadth and depth of 
modern sexual regulation. Having canvassed the “old sex bureaucracy,” Part III 
identifies what is truly innovative about the slice of the modern sex 
bureaucracy that Gersen and Suk have captured: administrators’ use of consent 
as the boundary dividing licit from illicit sex. This focus on consent—a key 
feature of classical liberal theory—suggests the neoliberal underpinnings of the 
modern sex bureaucracy and prompts broader questions about the logic of our 
governing order. This essay then briefly concludes. 
I. 
THE OLD SEX BUREAUCRACY 
The legal regulation of sexuality and sexual conduct is a persistent feature 
of American history. Regulated conduct has included actions that are violent 
and coercive, as well as what Gersen and Suk call “ordinary sex”—that is, 
adult sexual conduct that is entirely voluntary and that does not subordinate or 
do violence to one of the parties. The criminal law and its enforcers have had a 
vital role here, as Gersen and Suk note,20 but so, too, have administrative 
agencies outside of the justice system (defined conventionally as local, state, 
and federal institutions devoted to identifying and apprehending suspected 
criminals, prosecuting and adjudicating crimes, and administering formal 
punishment).21 Well before the DOE launched its crusade against sexual 
misconduct on college campuses, government bureaucrats in an array of fields 
regulated how people within the nation’s borders could act upon their sexual 
desires and what kind of sexual identities they could safely assume. Below we 
offer examples, drawing on a rich historical literature.22 
20. Gersen & Suk, supra note 1, at 887. 
21. We focus on administrative agencies outside of the justice system in order to tether our 
argument closely to Gersen and Suk’s. In doing so, we do not wish to imply that law enforcement 
institutions are not themselves bureaucracies. Gersen and Suk never explicitly make such a claim, and 
indeed note the sexual-regulatory work of prison bureaucracies, Id. at 884 n.7, but by placing the “sex 
bureaucracy” in stark opposition to the criminal justice system, they could be read to imply that the 
work of law enforcement (ranging from policing, to prosecution, to probation and parole 
administration) falls outside the bounds of the administrative state. On the benefits of understanding 
police as “street-level bureaucrats,” see, for example, MICHAEL LIPSKY, STREET-LEVEL 
BUREAUCRACY: THE DILEMMAS OF THE INDIVIDUAL IN PUBLIC SERVICE (1983). On the benefits of 
treating federal prosecutors as agents of the administrative state, see Rachel E. Barkow, Institutional 
Design and the Policing of Prosecutors: Lessons from Administrative Law, 61 STAN. L. REV. 869 
(2009). For more general treatments of the bureaucratic capacities and characteristics of law 
enforcement regimes, see, for example, Malcolm M. Feeley & Jonathan Simon, The New Penology: 
Notes on the Emerging Strategy of Corrections and Its Implications, 30 CRIMINOLOGY 449 (1992); 
Heather Schoenfeld, The Delayed Emergence of Penal Modernism in Florida, 16 PUNISHMENT & 
SOC. 258 (2014). 
22. For the sake of brevity, we have omitted other examples that are well-documented in the 
historical literature. A fuller version of this Section would include a discussion of the enforcement of 
the Tariff Act of 1842, which prohibited the importation of obscene material, and the Comstock Law 
of 1873, which expanded that prohibition to the U.S. mails. As interpreted by customs inspectors and 
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To be responsive to Gersen and Suk’s understanding of modern 
bureaucracy, we have focused on examples where the federal government’s 
imprint is apparent and where the hallmarks of a Weberian bureaucracy are on 
display.23 But we also note the interleaving of federal, state, and local 
administrative apparatuses, as well as the regulatory role of ostensibly private 
actors. Were we to exclude nonfederal actors from this history, we would 
obfuscate the way in which earlier iterations of America’s “sex bureaucracy” 
were able to reach millions of Americans’ intimate lives. As Gersen and Suk’s 
DOE example powerfully demonstrates, these techniques remain in use today. 
A. Immigration
Historians of immigration agree that in the late nineteenth century, 
immigrant women’s sexuality and sexual conduct were a source of deep 
Postal Service investigators, these prohibitions limited Americans’ access to information about sex and 
sexuality and also sent a strong message about appropriate and inappropriate sexual behavior. Good 
points of entry into this topic include HELEN LEFKOVITZ HOROWITZ, REREADING SEX: BATTLES 
OVER SEXUAL KNOWLEDGE AND SUPPRESSION IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 225–27, 386–
418 (2003); PATRICIA CLINE COHEN, TIMOTHY GILFOYLE, & HELEN LEFKOVITZ HOROWITZ, THE 
FLASH PRESS 90 (2008); DONNA DENNIS, LICENTIOUS GOTHAM: EROTIC PUBLISHING AND ITS 
PROSECUTION IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY NEW YORK (2009); and ANDREW WENDER COHEN, 
CONTRABAND: SMUGGLING AND THE BIRTH OF THE AMERICAN CENTURY 132–33 (2015). We would 
also discuss the sexual regulation of American Indians, via one of the nation’s earliest federal 
bureaucracies (the Indian Service and its subsequent iterations). Useful secondary sources on this topic 
include CATHLEEN D. CAHILL, FEDERAL FATHERS AND MOTHERS: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF THE 
UNITED STATES INDIAN SERVICE, 1869–1933 (2011); and MARK RIFKIN, WHEN DID INDIANS 
BECOME STRAIGHT? KINSHIP, THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY, AND NATIVE SOVEREIGNTY (2011). And 
we would no doubt include a discussion of state liquor licensing laws, which administrators deployed 
to reach the intimate lives of bar patrons, and state eugenics policies, which administrators used to 
regulate the sexuality of those deemed unable to control their impulses or unfit to bear children. 
Scholars who have explored sexual regulation via the administration of state liquor licensing laws 
include William N. Eskridge, Law and the Construction of the Closet: American Regulation of Same-
Sex Intimacy, 1880–1946, 82 IOWA L. REV. 1007, 1083–86 (1996); and Amanda H. Littaur, The B-
Girl Evil: Bureaucracy, Sexuality, and the Menace of Barroom Vice in Postwar California, 12 J. HIST. 
SEX. 171 (2003). The literature on eugenics policies and sexual regulation is broader. Useful sources 
include Michael Willrich, The Two-Percent Solution: Eugenic Jurisprudence and the Socialization of 
American Law, 1900–1930, 16 L. & HIST. REV. 63 (1998); WENDY KLINE, BUILDING A BETTER 
RACE: GENDER, SEXUALITY, AND EUGENICS FROM THE TURN OF THE CENTURY TO THE BABY BOOM 
(2001); Katherine Castles, Quiet Eugenics: Sterilization in North Carolina’s Institutions for the 
Mentally Retarded, 1945–1965, 68 J. S. HIST. 849 (2002); ALEXANDRA MINNA STERN, EUGENIC 
NATION: FAULTS AND FRONTIERS OF BETTER BREEDING IN MODERN AMERICA (2005). Last, there is 
at least one excellent historical work on the regulation of sexuality in prisons: REGINA KUNZEL, 
CRIMINAL INTIMACY: PRISON AND THE UNEVEN HISTORY OF MODERN AMERICAN SEXUALITY 
(2009). 
23. In explaining the “bureaucratic turn,” Gersen and Suk emphasize the administrative 
apparatus of the federal government; the bureaucracy they care most about is the federal bureaucracy, 
and the various “mini-bureaucracies” that it has incentivized within nongovernmental institutions. 
Gersen and Suk, supra note 1, at 883–84. They also associate bureaucracy with the idealization of 
expert knowledge (i.e., technocracy) and with Max Weber’s notion of a “legal-rational” form. Id. at 
883–85. 
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concern.24 On the West Coast, this concern was bound up with fears about 
Chinese laborers and their potential to undermine and debase white men.25 
More broadly, this concern reflected anxieties about racial purity and about the 
sexual independence that accompanied young women’s entrance into the paid 
labor force.26 Immigrant women appeared to be a possible vector of contagion, 
capable of infecting the general population with looser moral standards and 
sexually transmitted diseases.27 The job of protecting the nation from such 
contagion fell largely to federal administrators. 28 (As Lucy Salyer and others 
have noted, immigration officials comprised one of the earliest branches of 
what we now call the “administrative state.”)29 
As immigration authorities monitored the nation’s borders and the sexual 
attributes of those seeking entry, they enjoyed a robust arsenal of legal tools, as 
well as vast discretion. The 1891 revision of the Immigration Act (Act) barred 
entry to anyone who had been convicted of a crime “involving moral 
turpitude,” language that allowed administrators to interrogate women about 
adultery, bigamy, and other illicit sexual conduct.30 (The term “moral 
24. See generally Deirdre M. Moloney, Women, Sexual Morality, and Economic Dependency 
in Early U.S. Deportation Policy, 18 J. WOMEN’S HIST. 95, 99–100 (2006); DONNA GABACCACIA, 
FROM THE OTHER SIDE: WOMEN, GENDER, AND IMMIGRANT LIFE IN THE U.S., 1820–1990 (1994). 
25. Moloney, supra note 24, at 98–99; Kerry Abrams, Polygamy, Prostitution, and the 
Federalization of Immigration Law, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 641, 649–64 (2005); ERIKA LEE, AT 
AMERICA’S GATES: CHINESE IMMIGRATION DURING THE EXCLUSION ERA 25–27 (2003). On the 
endurance of anti-Asian immigrant sentiment into the twentieth century, see MAE M. NGAI, 
IMPOSSIBLE SUBJECTS: ILLEGAL ALIENS AND THE MAKING OF MODERN AMERICA 96–126 (2004). 
26. On the greater sexual freedom that accompanied women’s entry into the paid labor force, 
see generally KATHY PEISS, CHEAP AMUSEMENTS: WORKING WOMEN AND LEISURE IN TURN-OF-
THE-CENTURY NEW YORK (1986); JOANNE J. MEYEROWITZ, WOMEN ADRIFT: INDEPENDENT WAGE 
EARNERS IN CHICAGO, 1880–1930 (1988). On the anxieties that this freedom caused and the reform 
campaigns that followed, see generally MARY E. ODEM, DELINQUENT DAUGHTERS: PROTECTING 
AND POLICING ADOLESCENT FEMALE SEXUALITY IN THE UNITED STATES, 1885–1920 (1995); 
CHERYL D. HICKS, TALK WITH YOU LIKE A WOMAN: AFRICAN AMERICAN WOMEN, JUSTICE, AND 
REFORM IN NEW YORK, 1890–1935 (2010). 
27. EITHNE LUIBHÉID, ENTRY DENIED: CONTROLLING SEXUALITY AT THE BORDER 14 
(2002); NAYAN SHAH, CONTAGIOUS DIVIDES: EPIDEMICS AND RACE IN SAN FRANCISCO’S 
CHINATOWN 79–90 (2001); Abrams, supra note 25, at 661. 
28. For much of the nation’s history, state and local governments regulated the movement of 
foreigners into and within the United States, via settlement laws; the federal government’s 
responsibility was largely limited to naturalization. After the Civil War, however, the federal 
government claimed jurisdiction over this arena. See generally KUNAL PARKER, MAKING 
FOREIGNERS: IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP LAW IN AMERICA, 1600–2000 (2015). 
29. LUCY SALYER, LAWS HARSH AS TIGERS: CHINESE IMMIGRANTS AND THE SHAPING OF 
MODERN IMMIGRATION LAW (1995). 
30. Immigration Act of 1891, ch. 551, § 1, 26 Stat. 1084, 1084 (1891). The act also excluded 
polygamists. Id. The 1917 Immigration Act extended this exclusion to persons who “believe in or 
advocate the practice of polygamy.” Immigration Act of 1917, ch. 29, §3, 39 Stat. 874, 875 (1917). 
These provisions were bound up with lawmakers’ understandings of slavery, race, the Mormon faith, 
and federal power, and were thus about much more than sexual regulation. See generally SARAH 
BARRINGER GORDON, THE MORMON QUESTION: POLYGAMY AND CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICT IN 
NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA (2002). Nonetheless, a more expansive version of this Section 
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turpitude,” notably, was the administrators’ to define.)31 Even more powerfully, 
the Act deemed excludable any person “likely to become a public charge.”32 
Given women’s presumed economic dependence on men, this category 
provided a ready justification for interrogating women traveling without 
husbands and fathers.33 Subsequent legislation placed even more stress on 
immoral conduct and “immoral purpose,” which administrators interpreted to 
mean everything from intention to engage in prostitution to planned 
reunification with a married lover.34 
Other statutory provisions extended administrators’ reach well past the 
moment of admission, and, again, gave them considerable discretion to regulate 
immigrants’ intimate lives. Not only could a post-admission conviction for a 
crime of moral turpitude trigger deportation, but by 1907, a mere finding that a 
woman or girl had engaged in prostitution or was an “inmate” of a house of 
prostitution could result in the same, if the woman had been in the country for 
less than three years.35 The 1910 Mann Act, which prohibited the importation 
and interstate transportation of women for immoral purposes, ensured that a 
range of federal, state, and local officials were on the alert for just such 
behavior.36 By 1917, the net had expanded further still, to allow deportation of 
any alien “deriving any benefits from” any “place of amusement or resort 
habitually frequented by prostitutes.”37 As for those who engaged in 
prostitution (as determined by an administrator), the three-year window gave 
way to no time restriction at all.38 
In wielding these legal tools, administrators displayed a keen interest in 
criminally prohibited sex, but also went beyond the bounds of the criminal law 
to encroach on the “ordinary.” They questioned women extensively about their 
would discuss the full sexual-regulatory implications of the polygamy exclusion. For readers interested 
in this topic, a useful starting point is Abrams, supra note 25, at 641. 
31. MARGOT CANADAY, THE STRAIGHT STATE: SEXUALITY AND CITIZENSHIP IN 
TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA 24 (2010). 
32. Immigration Act of 1891, § 1. 
33. Moloney, supra note 24, at 94–97; GABACCACIA, supra note 24, at 37; NGAI, supra note 
25, at 78–79. 
34. Immigration Act of 1907, ch. 1134, § 2, 34 Stat. 898 (1907); LUIBHÉID, supra note 27, at 
10–11. For a fuller exploration of the meaning of the “immoral purpose” language in the 1907 
Immigration Act, see Ariela R. Dubler, Immoral Purposes: Marriage and the Genus of Illicit Sex, 115 
YALE L.J. 756, 777–81 (2006). 
35. Grace Peña Delgado, Border Control and Sexual Policing: White Slavery and Prostitution 
along the U.S.-Mexico Borderlands, 1903–1910, 43 W. HIST. Q. 157, 160 (2012). On the Immigration 
Bureau’s keen interest in this issue and the investigative agents it sent to localities around the country, 
even before the enactment of the Mann Act, see JESSICA R. PLILEY, POLICING SEXUALITY: THE 
MANN ACT AND THE MAKING OF THE FBI 32–59 (2014). 
36. LUIBHÉID, supra note 27, at 13. On the enforcement of the Mann Act in its early years, 
including the close cooperation between the Immigration Bureau and the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation, see PLILELY, supra note 35, at 84–105. 
37. Immigration Act of 1917, ch. 29, § 3, 39 Stat. 874 (1917). 
38. Id.; LUIBHÉID, supra note 27, at 15–16. 
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sexual histories, and would not hesitate to hang decisions on a single instance 
of nonmarital sex.39 They inspected single women’s prospective abodes, to 
ensure that their environments did not lend themselves to promiscuity.40 For 
women traveling with fiancés, they sometimes demanded marriage ceremonies 
on the dock.41 Even after admission, women could easily find themselves re-
ensnared by the immigration bureaucracy—for example, if they came into 
contact with law enforcement, or if an angry relative or spurned suitor decided 
to level an accusation of sexual impropriety.42 These practices combined to 
send a clear message to foreign-born women: in historian Deirdre Moloney’s 
words, “any sexual activity outside a legally-recognized marriage contract” had 
potentially severe consequences.43 
Federal immigration administrators also regulated men’s sexuality, not 
only through the laws and administrative techniques discussed above, but also 
via administrators’ inspection of immigrant bodies at points of entry. Historian 
Margot Canaday has explained the turn-of-the-century process as follows: if, 
during a cursory line inspection, an inspector flagged an immigrant as odd or 
frail, a full examination would follow, including questions about the 
immigrant’s sexual desires and practices and close examination of the 
immigrant’s body for signs of degeneracy, such as small or defective genitals.44 
Should any of these results prove too unsettling, the “likely to become a public 
charge” category once again provided a convenient grounds for exclusion: 
based on the prevailing assumptions of the time, men (and women) who did not 
conform to gender norms or who engaged in deviant sexual practices had poor 
economic prospects. For those immigrants who attracted the authorities’ 
attention after gaining admission, the same logic justified deportation.45 
Immigration authorities gained even more power to regulate sexuality in 
1952, when Congress ordered the exclusion of aliens “afflicted with 
39. Moloney, supra note 24, at 106–07, 113; LUIBHÉID, supra note 27, at 43. This 
administrative interest in isolated sexual encounters is noteworthy, for even in this era of intense 
preoccupation with nonmarital sex, consensual sex between an unmarried woman and an unmarried 
man was not universally recognized as a crime. See JoAnne Sweeney, Undead Statutes: The Rise, 
Fall, and Continued Use of Adultery and Fornication Criminal Laws, 46 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 127, 139–
40 (2014) (noting that “although some [state] adultery and fornication statutes required only a single 
act of sex, other statutes required habitual intercourse or cohabitation, which was presumed to harm 
society in general”). 
40. DORIS WEATHERFORD, FOREIGN AND FEMALE: IMMIGRANT WOMEN IN AMERICA, 1840–
1930, at 304–05 (1995). 
41. Id. at 305–06. 
42. NGAI, supra note 25, at 79. 
43. Moloney, supra note 25, at 113. 
44. CANADAY, supra note 31, at 33–35. 
45. Id. at 34–35, 40–44; see also Eskridge, supra note 22, at 1045–48. Many of Canaday’s 
examples involve men. For an account that focuses specifically on the exclusion of foreign-born 
women who appeared to be lesbians, see LUIBHÉID, supra note 27, at 77–101. 
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psychopathic personality.”46 Lawmakers understood this term to encompass 
homosexuality but did not provide more specific guidance. Whether a 
particular individual suffered from such an “affliction” was thus up to 
administrators—to the Immigration and Naturalization Service and the Public 
Health Service, to be precise.47 At the admission stage, these administrators 
based their decisions on physical examinations, “interviews for signs of mental 
aberration,” and other tests. At the deportation stage (the same law made 
homosexuality grounds for formal expulsion), federal authorities relied heavily 
on state and local law enforcement. For example, a mere arrest for loitering in a 
public restroom (a known site for homosexual encounters) was often enough to 
trigger deportation procedures.48 Such a tight link between the states’ capacious 
police power and the federal government’s similarly capacious plenary power 
surely made nonnatives think twice about where they went, whom they 
consorted with, and whether to act on their sexual desires. 
This narrative could continue,49 but by now the point should be clear: via 
the administration of immigration laws, bureaucrats actively regulated 
sexuality, well before the DOE got in on the act. Moreover, this vein of 
administrative regulation had implications well beyond the particular 
individuals who came into contact with immigration officials. As historian 
Eithne Luibhéid has explained, immigration regulation is “a means to literally 
construct the nation and [its] people.”50 In the case of the United States, one of 
the most striking and important acts of construction is of “patriarchal 
heterosexuality as the nation’s official sexual and gender order.”51 
B. War and National Security
Other examples of federal bureaucratic regulation of sexuality come from 
the arena of national security—from efforts to recruit and maintain soldiers, to 
reward them for their service, and to reintegrate them into civilian life at 
conflicts’ end. Like today’s DOE, the administrative apparatuses at issue here 
leveraged their responsibility over a discrete but sizeable domain to dictate 
what kinds of sexual identities and sexual conduct were acceptable.52 
46. The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 414, 66 Stat. 163 (1952). 
47. CANADAY, supra note 31, at 216–21. 
48. Id. at 223–27. 
49. For those interested in post–World War II developments, we recommend Eskridge, supra 
note 22; LUIBHÉID, supra note 27; Marc Stein, Boutilier and the U.S. Supreme Court’s Sexual 
Revolution, 23 L. & HIST. REV. 491 (2005). 
50. LUIBHÉID, supra note 27, at xviii; see also NGAI, supra note 25, at 3 (“Immigration policy 
is constitutive of Americans’ understanding of national membership and citizenship, drawing lines of 
inclusion and exclusion that articulate a desired composition . . . of the nation.”). 
51. WEATHERFORD, supra note 40, at xviii. 
52. Gersen and Suk recognize the sexual-regulatory work that the military performs today. 
Gersen & Suk, supra note 1, at 884 n.7. This Section illuminates some of the many predecessors to 
these contemporary efforts. 
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One site of persistent sexual regulation was the civilian spaces around 
military bases and training camps. During World War I, as historian 
Christopher Capozzola has demonstrated, the War Department and its partners 
in the realms of private charity and local civic life vigilantly patrolled such 
spaces, looking for women who appeared to be prostitutes. No legal definition 
anchored these searches, allowing for the targeting of any woman who 
appeared willing to engage in casual sexual encounters with enlisted men.53 
War Department administrators and their vast network of private deputies not 
only detained such women, but also subjected them to medical examinations 
and, in some cases, internment, in settings ranging from hospitals and prisons 
to “no-privileges cottages” and workhouses.54 As in the immigration context, 
formal criminal charges were sometimes part of the equation but were by no 
means a necessary precondition for administrative action.55 
The World War II story is similar: Shortly after the United States 
officially entered the war, the Federal Security Administration created a special 
Social Protection Division (SPD) to protect soldiers against venereal disease, a 
mission that translated into identifying and disciplining promiscuous women. 
With the help of various public and private organizations, ranging from local 
law enforcement agencies to the American Bar Association, the SPD worked to 
shut down places likely to employ such women and to detain and treat those 
women who came to authorities’ attention.56 Meanwhile, in other branches of 
the administrative state, such as the military and the Public Health Service, 
administrators signaled that they viewed servicemen’s (heterosexual) activity 
as perhaps unfortunate but inevitable. In contrast to the heavy-handed 
regulation of women, the regulation of men’s sexuality took the form of 
prophylactic materials and education on how to minimize health risks.57 
The post-war administration of the G.I. Bill of Rights (G.I. Bill) is also 
illustrative of the forceful role that administrative agencies played in regulating 
ordinary sex, and here the affected population was truly vast. Best known for 
53. CHRISTOPHER CAPOZZOLA, UNCLE SAM WANTS YOU: WORLD WAR I AND THE MAKING 
OF THE MODERN AMERICAN CITIZEN 132–34 (2008). 
54. Id. 
55. Id. For more on this history, see NANCY K. BRISTOW, MAKING MEN MORAL: SOCIAL 
ENGINEERING DURING THE GREAT WAR (1996); COURTNEY Q. SHAH, SEX ED, SEGREGATED: THE 
QUEST FOR SEXUAL KNOWLEDGE IN PROGRESSIVE-ERA AMERICA 78–129 (2015). Shah also details 
the War Department’s efforts to educate women and girls on appropriate sexual behavior. SHAH, 
supra, at 113–17. 
56. MARILYN E. HEGARTY, VICTORY GIRLS, KHAKI-WACKIES, AND PATRIOTUTES: THE 
REGULATION OF FEMALE SEXUALITY DURING WORLD WAR II 12–41 (2008). In an interesting 
example of administrative resourcefulness, New Deal–era Civilian Conservation Corps camps became 
warehouses for these women. Id. at 77. 
57. Id. at 100–103. For more on this point, and for a discussion of the sharply contrasting 
approach that administrators took to servicewomen, see Leisa D. Meyer, Creating G.I. Jane: The 
Regulation of Sexuality and Sexual Behavior in the Women’s Army Corps During World War II, 18 
FEMINIST STUD. 581 (1992). 
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offering generous education, unemployment, and home ownership benefits to 
World War II veterans,58 the G.I. Bill also became a mechanism for sexual 
regulation, as shown by historian Margot Canaday. Via a 1945 ruling, the 
Veterans Administration (VA) made clear that no benefits would be available 
to soldiers to whom the military had issued an undesirable discharge “because 
of homosexual acts or tendencies.”59 
A servicemember’s “undesirable” discharge was itself a product of 
administrative decisionmaking, by a three-officer board of the relevant military 
branch. Such boards made their decisions based on hearings, which were 
significantly less protective of the accused than formal court-martial 
proceedings. The boards were not bound by rules of evidence, nor did the 
accused soldier have the right to counsel.60 
And yet the effect of an “undesirable” discharge was considerable. 
Potential employers and universities asked to see discharge papers, and the 
“undesirable” notation inevitably raised suspicion. The VA’s interpretation of 
the G.I. Bill dramatically heightened the consequences. According to 
Canaday’s estimates, the VA ruling prevented nine thousand veterans from 
accessing benefits that the statute arguably entitled them to enjoy.61 In effect, 
VA administrators punished soldiers for deviating from heterosexual norms 
and implicitly encouraged many others to stay firmly in the closet.62 
Ultimately, policymakers recognized the hardship that the VA’s policy 
caused and created a way for undesirably discharged veterans to regain some of 
what they had lost.63 But here again, the mechanism provided federal 
bureaucrats with an opportunity to reinforce the imperative of respectable 
heterosexual behavior: Upon application, the Department of Labor was 
authorized to issue an “Exemplary Rehabilitation Certificate,” documentation 
that would not erase the black mark from the applicant’s military record but 
might ease the doubts of prospective employers and others.64 That 
58. See Melissa E. Murray, Whatever Happened to G.I. Jane?: Citizenship, Gender, and 
Social Policy in the Postwar Era, 9 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 91, 105 (2002) (describing the benefits 
associated with the G.I. Bill). On the enduring importance of these benefits to veterans and their 
families, see IRA KATZNELSON, WHEN AFFIRMATIVE ACTION WAS WHITE: AN UNTOLD HISTORY OF 
RACIAL INEQUALITY IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA (2005); SUZANNE METTLER, SOLDIERS TO 
CITIZENS: THE G.I. BILL AND THE MAKING OF THE GREATEST GENERATION (2005). 
59. Margot Canaday, Building a Straight State: Sexuality and Social Citizenship Under the 
1944 G.I. Bill, 90 J. AM. HIST. 935, 935 (2003). 
60. Id. at 950. 
61. Statutory language and legislative history suggests that Congress intended to exclude only 
those who were discharged “dishonorably”; an “undesirable” discharge fell somewhere between 
“honorable” and “dishonorable.” Id. at 940–41. 
62. Id. at 956–57. 
63. Id. at 953. 
64. Id. at 954. 
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administrative decision turned on how persuasively the applicant demonstrated 
reform—that is, on how thoroughly he embraced male, heterosexual norms.65 
As with the previous discussion on immigration regulation, other 
examples could add depth and nuance.66 But we hope that a fundamental point 
is clear: for many Americans who have come into contact with the nation’s 
national security apparatus, Gersen and Suk’s description of the modern “sex 
bureaucracy” would appear more familiar than strange. 
C. Welfare
Laws and policies governing public income support were another well-
used avenue for administrative sexual regulation, one that, again, has 
implicated all levels of government, as well as ostensibly private actors. 
Policies from this realm are arguably the most similar to those of the education 
realm, the focus of Gersen and Suk’s article. Americans often think of both 
welfare and education (especially higher education) as privileges or benefits, 
not basic entitlements. Nonetheless, these benefits have held deep significance 
to the millions of people who needed and wanted them and have therefore 
offered administrators considerable leverage over beneficiaries’ intimate 
lives.67 
The New Deal is a convenient starting point (although by no means the 
first instance of sexual regulation via poor relief).68 Since 1935, the need-based 
program that we now call “welfare” has been the shared responsibility of the 
federal government and the states; the federal government subsidizes the cost 
and the states administer the program, subject to federal rules.69 (This program 
was originally called Aid to Dependent Children; it is now Temporary Aid to 
Needy Families.) 
As the demographics of the welfare rolls shifted in the 1940s and 1950s, 
to include more black Americans and more women who had never been 
married, many states responded by proposing policies targeting poor women’s 
65. Id. at 953–54. For a broader exploration of the experience of gays and lesbians in the 
military during this era and the administration of antihomosexual policies and procedures, see ALLAN 
BÉRUBÉ, COMING OUT UNDER FIRE: THE HISTORY OF GAY MEN AND WOMEN DURING WORLD 
WAR TWO (1990); Eskridge, supra note 22, at 1087–93. 
66. A fuller discussion would include the military’s sexual regulation of soldiers and private 
contractors abroad, as well as the bureaucratic enforcement of the “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” policy 
(inaugurated under President William Clinton). 
67. Charles Reich made this point powerfully fifty-two years ago. Charles A. Reich, The New 
Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964). 
68. For earlier examples, see MIMI ABRAMOVITZ, REGULATING THE LIVES OF WOMEN: 
SOCIAL WELFARE POLICY FROM COLONIAL TIMES TO THE PRESENT (1988). 
69. See Karen M. Tani, Welfare and Rights Before the Movement: Rights as a Language of the 
State, 122 YALE L.J. 314, 325–30 (2012) (explaining the basic structure and history of the program we 
now call “welfare”). 
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sexual conduct.70 These ranged from schemes to sterilize women who gave 
birth to multiple “illegitimate” children to proposals to condition assistance on 
a mother’s disavowal of “illicit” relationships.71 Most common by the late 
1950s, however, were proposals to simply deny benefits to children born out of 
wedlock, a signal to poor women that the cost of nonmarital sex would be the 
wellbeing of their families.72 
Federal administrators had reservations about these proposed laws and 
dissuaded states from enacting them when possible,73 but they had more 
difficulty when states framed their proposals as “suitable home” laws rather 
than blatant efforts to discriminate against illegitimate children.74 “Suitability” 
determinations were a tradition within the state-level mothers’ pension 
programs that preceded the federally subsidized Aid to Dependent Children 
program, and these determinations seemed to fall within the discretion that 
Congress had given the states.75 Federal dollars thus directly subsidized state 
and local bureaucracies as they policed nonmarital sex.76 
Federal administrators took a more forceful stance in 1961, after 
Louisiana welfare officials used a suitable home policy to purge 22,500 
children (mostly black) from the welfare rolls, all on the basis of their mothers’ 
alleged immorality.77 Even after the federal prohibition of suitable home laws, 
however, sexual regulation of poor women continued. In some states, 
lawmakers quickly replaced suitable home laws with “man in the house” or 
“substitute father” restrictions, which denied public assistance benefits to 
households where there was evidence of a male presence. States could defend 
these restrictions on the grounds that they were not based on the mother’s 
morality, but rather on the family’s lack of need, in light of the income support 
that the “man in the house” presumably provided.78 In their enforcement and 
effect, however, these policies performed the same regulatory work: state and 
70. In the mid-twentieth century, concerns about black women’s sexuality were bound up with 
fears of crumbling racial hierarchies and the decline of the nuclear, two-parent family. See RICKIE 
SOLINGER, WAKE UP LITTLE SUSIE, 45–53, 187–99 (2000); Anders Walker, Legislating Virtue: How 
Segregationists Disguised Racial Discrimination as Moral Reform Following Brown v. Board of 
Education, 47 DUKE L.J. 399 (1997). These concerns gained further urgency from some Americans’ 
perception of themselves as besieged taxpayers, footing the bill for poor black women’s improprieties. 
MOLLY C. MICHELMORE, TAX AND SPEND: THE WELFARE STATE, TAX POLITICS, AND THE LIMITS 
OF AMERICAN LIBERALISM 3 (2012). 
71. KAREN M. TANI, STATES OF DEPENDENCY: WELFARE, RIGHTS, AND AMERICAN 
GOVERNANCE, 1935–1972, at 206–08 (2016). 
72. Id. 
73. Id. at 208–09. 
74. Id. at 210; WINIFRED BELL, AID TO DEPENDENT CHILDREN 67–75 (1965). 
75. BELL, supra note 74, at 29–30. 
76. Id. at 93–110; TANI, supra note 71, at 209–11. 
77. TANI, supra note 71, at 212–21; Taryn Lindhorst & Leslie Leighninger, “Ending Welfare 
as We Know It” in 1960: Louisiana’s Suitable Home Law, 77 SOC. SERV. REV. 564 (2003). 
78. See TANI, supra note 71, at 258. 
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local administrators focused not on whether children had adequate resources 
but on whether the children’s mothers were having sex.79 Administrators would 
sometimes ask women directly about sexual conduct; in other instances, they 
would interview the women’s children, or solicit tips from neighbors.80 There 
were also many reports of unannounced searches of women’s homes, often at 
night or in the early morning.81 
Ultimately, in 1968, the Supreme Court invalidated “man in the house” 
laws,82 but sexual regulation continued, both via state administrators who 
refused to respect the Court’s decision83 and via new and different welfare 
policies (which, like the suitable home laws, often targeted black women in 
particular). Welfare policies aimed at procuring child support for poor children 
are one example. As administered, these policies have required women to 
identify previous sexual partners, on pain of losing government support.84 
Heterosexual marriage promotion and abstinence education policies, such as 
those authorized by the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity 
Reconciliation Act (1996), are another example.85 Encouraged by federal 
incentives, state administrators (along with state-funded private contractors) 
have discouraged poor women from engaging in sexual activity outside of 
traditional marriage.86 Notably, some of these educatory and preventative state 
programs have drawn on the extensive state-local bureaucracy of education to 
reach well beyond the poor, capturing all children in the public school 
system.87 
79. Alison Lefkovitz, Men in the House: Race, Welfare, and the Regulation of Men’s Sexuality 
in the United States, 1961–1972, 20 J. HIST. SEXUALITY 594, 600–01 (2011). 
80. Id. at 601, 605; LISA LEVENSTEIN, A MOVEMENT WITHOUT MARCHES: AFRICAN 
AMERICAN WOMEN AND THE POLITICS OF POVERTY IN POSTWAR PHILADELPHIA 51 (2009). 
81. See SOLINGER, supra note 70, at 52–53; Charles A. Reich, Midnight Welfare Searches and 
the Social Security Act, 72 YALE L.J. 1347 (1963); BELL, supra note 74, at 87–92. 
82. King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968) (holding that Alabama’s morality-based “suitable 
home” policy violated federal law); see also New Jersey Welfare Rights Org. v. Cahill, 411 U.S. 619 
(1973) (finding a violation of the Equal Protection Clause where a state welfare law denied benefits to 
children born out of wedlock). 
83. Lefkovitz, supra note 79, at 605. 
84. Anna Marie Smith, The Sexual Regulation Dimension of Contemporary Welfare Law: A 
Fifty State Overview, 8 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 121, 139–44 (2002); see also JOHN GILLIOM, 
OVERSEERS OF THE POOR: SURVEILLANCE, RESISTANCE, AND THE LIMITS OF PRIVACY 31 (2001); 
Gwendolyn Mink, From Welfare to Wedlock: Marriage Promotion and Poor Mothers’ Inequality, 11 
GOOD SOC. 68, 69 (2002). 
85. Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996); see also Angela Onwuachi-Willig, The 
Return of the Ring: Welfare Reform’s Marriage Cure as the Revival of Post-Bellum Control, 93 
CALIF. L. REV. 1647, 1675–78 (2005). 
86. See, e.g., Phoebe G. Silag, Note, To Have, To Hold, To Receive Public Assistance: TANF 
and Marriage Promotion Policies, 7 J. GENDER, RACE & JUST. 413 (2003); Smith, supra note 84, at 
184–209. For the racial politics of these policies, see Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 85. 
87. Silag, supra note 86, at 423–25. On the well-established role of the federal government 
and its administrative agencies in shaping young people’s understandings of sex and sexuality, see, for 
example, Alexandra M. Lord, Models of Masculinity: Sex Education, the United States Public Health 
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D. Public Employment
In their discussion of the “sex bureaucracy,” Gersen and Suk associate 
both bureaucracy and administrative governance more generally with federal 
agencies. These agencies, however, are only one of many venues in which the 
government may exercise regulatory authority over sex. Indeed, the 
government, in its role as a federal, state, and local public employer, has long 
regulated seemingly private sexual conduct. This regulatory work belongs in 
our account of the “sex bureaucracy” because it has generally occurred via 
bureaucratic disciplinary and grievance procedures (procedures that have 
themselves been informed by legal-bureaucratic mandates). 
For the sake of hewing as closely as possible to Gersen and Suk’s article, 
however, we will begin with a public employment example where federal 
agencies were, in fact, deeply implicated: the federal government’s systematic 
investigation of its employees for homosexual tendencies, on the grounds that 
such employees posed loyalty-security risks.88 The Cold War–era “lavender 
scare”—carefully documented by historian David Johnson—began with a 1947 
State Department investigation and rippled outward, soon implicating all 
federal agencies.89 
As in the immigration and national security examples detailed above, the 
detection of homosexuals within government ranks was a bureaucratic affair, 
and often a deeply intrusive one. Loyalty-security investigators not only 
checked police records but also made inquiries at employees’ former schools, 
workplaces, and residences; investigated employees’ friends and associates, in 
an effort to establish “guilt by association”; questioned employees about their 
sexual habits and histories; and encouraged those under investigation to 
implicate others.90 Johnson estimates that thousands of federal employees lost 
their jobs as a result of the anti-gay purges of the early Cold War years.91 
Johnson also details the purges’ broader effects: government workers and 
private contractors concealed their sexual identities, curtailed their social 
Service, and the YMCA, 1919–1924, 58 J. HIST. MED. & ALLIED SCI. 123 (2003); and see also SHAH, 
supra note 55; GABRIEL N. ROSENBERG, THE 4-H HARVEST: SEXUALITY AND THE STATE IN RURAL 
AMERICA (2016). 
88. Anti-communists portrayed gay men and lesbian women as deviant, soft, prone to 
debauchery, and, for all of these reasons, vulnerable to the seductions and manipulations of communist 
agents. DAVID K. JOHNSON, THE LAVENDER SCARE: THE COLD WAR PERSECUTION OF GAYS AND 
LESBIANS IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 5–10, 31–37 (2005); LANDON R. Y. STORRS, THE SECOND 
RED SCARE AND THE UNMAKING OF THE NEW DEAL LEFT 90–97 (2015). These characterizations 
were closely related to popular assumptions about the ways that totalitarian regimes suppressed 
“natural and proper gender roles.” STORRS, supra, at 90. 
89. JOHNSON, supra note 88, at 79–99. Johnson also describes how the tactics pioneered in the 
federal administrative state spread to businesses and universities. Id. at 168. 
90. Id. at 73–74, 149–61. 
91. Id. at 166. 
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activities, abandoned their preferred careers, and sometimes even took their 
own lives.92 
By the late 1950s, anti-communist loyalty programs became less 
aggressive, lowering the stakes of alleged homosexuality. But public employers 
continued to regulate sex and sexuality that did not hew to the marital model. 
We are aware of no comprehensive history of this issue, but reported cases are 
suggestive. Consider, for example, the facts of Andrade v. City of Phoenix93: 
When evidence surfaced that three Phoenix police officers had engaged in 
adultery (technically a criminal offense in their jurisdiction, but one that rarely 
led to prosecution), the Phoenix police department initiated administrative 
disciplinary actions against the officers for violating the department’s 
professional code of conduct.94 Two of the officers lost their jobs for engaging 
in conduct “unbecoming an officer.”95 
The facts of Hollenbaugh v. Carnegie Free Library96 are also instructive. 
There, a public library’s Board of Trustees initiated an administrative 
disciplinary process, whereby board members voted to terminate the 
employment of two employees whose adulterous office romance resulted in 
pregnancy and cohabitation.97 The board was especially concerned that the 
couple had no plans to “‘normalize[]’ their relationship through marriage.”98 
For a third variation on this theme, see Andrews v. Drew Municipal 
Separate School District,99 a case that arose after a school superintendent 
promulgated a county-wide regulation that rendered unwed mothers ineligible 
for employment as teachers and teachers’ aides. Although based primarily on 
the superintendent’s “personal convictions concerning morality,” the policy 
had a broad impact, reaching all women employees and all potential job 
applicants.100 As with the previous examples, this policy was an administrative 
attack on “deviant” sexuality at a time when the criminal regulation of 
sexuality appeared to be waning. As importantly, all of these examples 
involved what Gersen and Suk would term “ordinary” sex—that is, a type of 
92. Id. at 149–167. On the fear and trauma that came from being ensnared in anti-communist 
purges, see also ELLEN SCHRECKER, MANY ARE THE CRIMES: MCCARTHYISM IN AMERICA 359–68 
(1998). 
93. 692 F.2d 557, 559 (9th Cir. 1982). 
94. Id. at 558. 
95. Id. For a much earlier example of this phenomenon, see Eskridge, supra note 22, at 1082
(discussing the case of Henry Gerber, whose advocacy on behalf of the rights of homosexuals in the 
1920s led to disorderly conduct charges and who lost his job with the U.S. Postal Service—for 
“conduct unbecoming a postal worker”—after his lawyer succeeded in having those charges 
dismissed). 
96. 436 F. Supp. 1328, 1332 (W.D. Pa. 1977) aff’d, 578 F.2d 1374 (3d Cir. 1978). 
97. Id. at 1330–32. 
98. Id. at 1331. 
99. 371 F. Supp. 27 (N.D. Miss. 1973), aff’d, 507 F.2d 611 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. granted, 423 
U.S. 820 (1975), cert. dismissed as improvidently granted, 425 U.S. 559 (1976). 
100. Id. at 30. 
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sex that was nonviolent, nonharassing, and consensual, and in which law 
enforcement officials apparently perceived no societal harm, and thus no 
pressing need for criminal prosecution. As others have noted, these 
administrative actions ensured that, even as criminal law declined as an engine 
of sexual regulation, the private lives and choices of individual citizens 
remained a matter of public concern and regulation.101 
* * *
The historical regulatory efforts we have discussed differ from each other 
in many regards, including the goals advanced and the techniques employed. 
What they collectively suggest, however, is a well-established and multi-sited 
sex bureaucracy, with the ability to reach deep into at least some Americans’ 
intimate lives. 
This last point includes an important caveat—one that validates a vital 
strand of Gersen and Suk’s argument. Although the “sex bureaucracy” they 
describe has made headlines for intruding on the prerogatives of elite, 
heterosexual men,102 Gersen and Suk worry deeply about its potential disparate 
impact on a less privileged subset of this group: men of color. As they note, the 
DOE’s own Office for Civil Rights has recognized in other contexts that 
“African-American students were disciplined more harshly and more 
frequently because of their race than similarly situated white students.”103 
The history recounted above validates these concerns about selective 
enforcement. Indeed, we should also ask whether contemporary bureaucratic 
processes accord fair treatment to victims of color, as well as to victims who 
are gay, lesbian, and transgender—groups whose rights to bodily autonomy 
have historically been vulnerable.104 We should ask, too, whether these 
101. See generally Melissa Murray, Rights and Regulation: The Evolution of Sexual 
Regulation, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 573 (2016). On the Andrews case, see also Serena Mayeri, Marital 
Supremacy and the Constitution of the Nonmarital Family, 103 CALIF. L. REV. 1277, 1316–27 (2015). 
102. See, e.g., Peter Berkowitz, College Rape Accusations and the Presumption of Male Guilt, 
WALL ST. J. (Aug. 20, 2011), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424053111903596904576516232905230642; Valerie 
Bauerlain, In Campus Rape Tribunals, Some Men See Injustice, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 10, 2015), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/in-campus-rape-tribunals-some-men-see-injustice-1428684187; Fred 
Barbash, Former Ivy League Athlete Suspended for Alleged Sexual Assault Wins Important—and 
Surprising—Court Victory, WASH. POST (Aug. 1, 2016), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2016/08/01/former-ivy-league-athlete-
suspended-for-alleged-sexual-assault-wins-important-and-surprising-court-victory/. 
103. Gersen & Suk, supra note 1, at 943; see also Janet Halley, Trading the Megaphone for the 
Gavel in Title IX Enforcement, 128 HARV. L. REV. F. 103, 106–10 (2015) (drawing on history and 
contemporary cases to elucidate concerns about “bias against and disproportionate impact on sexually 
stigmatized minorities” who may be accused of sexual assault). 
104. There is abundant literature on the vulnerability of nonwhite women to sexual violence 
and the inadequacy of the state’s response. Classic examples include Kimberlé Crenshaw, Mapping 
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processes accord fair treatment to victims who are heterosexual men and whose 
experiences thereby contradict dominant characterizations of sexual assault.105 
The harsh truth is that although America’s sex bureaucracy has had a broad 
reach, it has never prioritized equality. Rather, it has tended to police and 
perpetuate difference. 
More generally, however, the history we have summarized raises 
questions for Gersen and Suk’s argument. Other than the relative privilege of 
the regulated group,106 what precisely differentiates today’s sex bureaucracy 
from its previous iterations? In the following Section we offer additional 
observations about the contemporary sex bureaucracy in order to identify what 
has changed in recent years and why Gersen and Suk’s slice of this 
bureaucracy is so fascinating and arguably so troubling.107 
the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. 
REV. 1241 (1991); and Kimberlé Crenshaw, Race, Gender, and Sexual Harassment, 65 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 1467 (1992). More recent examples, directly relevant to concerns about unequal treatment by 
bureaucratic decision makers, include Geneva Brown, Ain’t I a Victim? The Intersectionality of Race, 
Class, and Gender in Domestic Violence and the Courtroom, 19 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 147 
(2012); I. Bennett Capers, Real Women, Real Rape, 60 UCLA L. REV. 826, 860–71 (2013); Kate 
Sablosky Elengold, Structural Subjugation: Theorizing Racialized Sexual Harassment in Housing, 27 
YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 227, 264 (2016). On sexual violence against persons who are gay, lesbian, and 
transgender and access to justice, see, for example, Leigh Goodmark, When Is a Battered Woman Not 
a Battered Woman? When She Fights Back, 201 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 75 (2008); Rebecca L. 
Stotzer, Violence and Transgender People: A Review of United States Data, 14 AGGRESSION & 
VIOLENT BEHAVIOR 170 (2009); Emily F. Rothman, Deinera Exner, & Allyson L. Baughman, The 
Prevalence of Sexual Assault Against People Who Identify as Gay, Lesbian, or Bisexual in the United 
States: A Systematic Review, 12 TRAUMA, VIOLENCE, & ABUSE 55 (2011); Rannveig Sigurvinsdottir 
& Sarah E. Ullman, The Role of Sexual Orientation in the Victimization and Recovery of Sexual 
Assault Survivors, 30 VIOLENCE & VICTIMS 636 (2015). 
105. See Bennett Capers, Real Rape Too, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 1259, 1264 (2011) (arguing that 
rape remains a gendered crime and calling attention to the “unjust silence surrounding male rape 
victimization”); Bennett Capers, On “Violence Against Women,” 13 OHIO STATE J. CRIM. L. 347, 353 
(2016) (noting the current overlap between the concepts of “violence against women” and “sexual 
assault” in law and policy and identifying male victims as a casualty of that overlap). 
106. To be clear, we are not implying that all college students are “privileged.” Indeed, we 
know that is not the case. See Vicki Madden, Op-ed, Why Poor Students Struggle, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 
21, 2014), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/22/opinion/why-poor-students-struggle.html; 
Jason DeParle, For Poor, Leap to College Often Ends in Hard Fall, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 22 2012), 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/23/education/poor-students-struggle-as-class-plays-a-
greater-role-in-success.html. We are drawing a contrast between a regulated population consisting of 
all college students (of all genders, classes, races, and so on) and the regulated populations we have 
discussed elsewhere in this Section. 
107. What we do not do, in the Sections that follow, is compare the DOE’s precise practices to 
those of their sexual-regulatory predecessors elsewhere in the administrative state. We have reason to 
suspect that in at least one dimension—procedural protections—the DOE’s regulatory efforts 
demonstrate greater respect for regulated individuals than in the past, despite the DOE’s imposition of 
an evidentiary standard (“preponderance of the evidence”) that is less protective of the rights of the 
accused than the standard used in criminal trials. (The lack of process historically accorded to 
immigrants, for example, is well known.) But we flag this as an empirical question that deserves 
exploration. 
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II. 
“THE BUREAUCRATIC TURN”: A MORE NUANCED PORTRAIT 
If the administrative regulation of sex and sexuality has a deeper history, 
dating at least back to the late nineteenth century, what distinguishes Gersen 
and Suk’s modern sex bureaucracy? Gersen and Suk would likely direct our 
attention to the decriminalization and displacement aspect of their argument—
that is, to the recent migration of sexual regulation away from the enforcement 
of criminal prohibitions to the realm of civil and administrative law. To use 
constitutional law as a convenient tool of periodization, they are interested in 
the world that Lawrence v. Texas108 made. As Gersen and Suk argue, it was 
after Lawrence that we see the “transmut[ation]” of sexual regulation into the 
kind of regime that could truly be called “bureaucratic.”109 
We share Gersen and Suk’s commitment to identifying and exploring 
shifts in the modes of sexual regulation,110 and we agree in general with this 
narrative of decriminalization and transmutation.111 We note, however, that, 
like the sex bureaucracy itself, the phenomena that Gersen and Suk describe 
have a history, one that places their examples in a different light. 
As an initial matter, the decriminalization of sex that was so apparent in 
Lawrence had, in fact, been underway for at least fifty years.112 As historian 
Lawrence Friedman noted in 1993, ten years prior to Lawrence, “much of the 
criminal fabric of the sex laws” had simply “rotted away” in the second half of 
the twentieth century.113 Indeed, it is possible to see a large-scale 
decriminalization effort as early as 1951, in the launch of the American Law 
Institute’s Model Penal Code (MPC) project, which sought to rationalize and 
reform the diverse state-level criminal codes into a modern penal code that 
could be adopted in whole or in part by jurisdictions.114 In doing so, the MPC 
drafters recognized that most state-level criminal prohibitions on fornication, 
adultery, cohabitation, and consensual sodomy went unenforced.115 Concerned 
that a lack of consistent enforcement would lead to selective enforcement 
against vulnerable populations, and would cultivate disrespect for the justice 
system, the drafters sought to decriminalize those offenses that involved private 
sexual conduct between consenting adults—that is, the types of sexual conduct 
108. 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
109. Gersen & Suk, supra note 1, at 887. 
110. See Murray, supra note 101. 
111. Although we are committed to showing that “ordinary sex” has always been regulated, 
including by administrative agencies, we have no interest in claiming that it was always regulated in 
the same ways, with the same tools. See Murray, supra note 101. 
112. See generally Melissa Murray, Griswold’s Criminal Law, 47 CONN. L. REV. 1045 (2015) 
(discussing the history of sexuality’s decriminalization and liberalization). 
113. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY 341 (1993). 
114. This discussion relies generally on Murray, supra note 112. 
115. Id. at 1051–52. 
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that Gersen and Suk would now term “ordinary sex.”116 Although the MPC 
reforms were not adopted uniformly,117 the effort to reform criminal sexual 
regulation sparked a broader conversation about whether it was appropriate to 
use the criminal law to police and enforce sexual norms.118 By the 1980s, most 
criminal prohibitions on “ordinary sex” were either eliminated by judicial or 
legislative fiat, or languished in a state of desuetude, on the books but 
infrequently enforced.119 
With this history in mind, Lawrence is less a line in the sand, marking a 
clear shift away from criminal sexual regulation, and more the culmination of 
an ongoing project of decriminalization that was underway decades before the 
Supreme Court sounded the final death knell for the criminal regulation of 
“ordinary sex.” 
In the decades preceding Lawrence we can also discern the displacement 
or transmutation effect that so troubles Gersen and Suk—that is, the 
deployment of administrative adjudication and discipline in lieu of criminal 
prosecution.120 Consider the three cases discussed earlier, Andrade, 
Hollenbaugh, and Andrews. These cases are not simply evidence of the 
administrative state’s long-standing role in regulating sex and sexuality; they 
can also be read as illustrations of the displacement effect—well before the 
DOE began to regulate sexual conduct on college and university campuses. In 
all three cases, criminal prohibitions on the sexual conduct at issue were on the 
books, but went unenforced. Instead, administrative disciplinary processes 
filled the regulatory role that criminal law might have occupied. By threatening 
the livelihoods and hard-earned professional status of the sexual transgressors, 
these administrative processes punished the transgressive behavior and sent 
strong signals to everyone in the transgressors’ orbit. 
We would go further to argue that not only is the displacement or 
transmutation dynamic older than the DOE’s recent regulatory efforts, but that 
it has also been more sweeping in its breadth. Gersen and Suk have helpfully 
trained our eyes on the federal administrative state, and specifically on those 
administrators charged with enforcing federal anti-discrimination laws. But we 
116. Id. 
117. See Diana Hassel, The Use of Criminal Sodomy Laws in Civil Litigation, 79 TEX. L. REV. 
813, 819 (2001) (“Over the course of the next two decades, twenty-two states followed the lead of the 
American Law Institute and decriminalized sodomy and other adult consensual sex acts.”). 
118. Murray, supra note 112, at 1054 (noting “the emergence of a robust debate about whether 
and how to draw limits on the state’s authority to criminalize private consensual sex between adults”). 
119. See Darryl K. Brown, Democracy and Decriminalization, 86 TEX. L. REV. 223, 235–36 
(2007); see, e.g., Model Penal Code § 213.6 note on adultery and fornication, at 435 (Official Draft 
and Revised Comments 1980) (describing laws against fornication and adultery as “dead-letter 
statutes”). 
120. See Murray, supra note 101, at 586–91. 
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maintain that the sex bureaucracy implicates the entire administrative state, 
including bureaucratic apparatuses at the state and local level. 
Two post-Lawrence cases concerning “ordinary sex” by public employees 
are suggestive of this breadth: Seegmiller v. LaVerkin City121 and Anderson v. 
City of LaVergne.122 In Seegmiller, Sharon Johnson, a police officer in the 
midst of a contentious divorce, attended an out-of-town training conference 
paid for in part by her employer, the LaVerkin City police department.123 
During the conference, but after the training sessions had ended for the day, 
Johnson had “a brief affair with an officer from another department who was 
also attending the conference.”124 Based on her estranged husband’s allegations 
of other professional misconduct, the LaVerkin City Council investigated 
Johnson’s activities on and off the job and ultimately issued a formal reprimand 
for the affair, based on a provision in the law enforcement code of ethics 
requiring an officer to “keep [her] private life unsullied as an example to all 
and [to] behave in a manner that does not bring discredit to [the officer] or [the] 
agency.”125 Future violations of the professional code, the city warned Johnson, 
would result in “additional discipline up to and including termination.”126 
In Anderson, Michael Anderson and Lisa Lewis, coworkers at the 
LaVergne police department, began a romantic relationship after meeting on 
the job.127 Anderson was a police officer, and Lewis worked as an 
administrative assistant for the department.128 Three months after the couple 
began their relationship, the police chief, concerned that “intra-office dating 
between employees of different ranks . . . might lead to sexual harassment 
claims against the department,” issued an administrative order directing 
Anderson and Lewis to “cease all contact with each other” outside of the 
workplace.129 Despite the order, Anderson and Lewis continued to be 
“romantically and sexually involved.”130 Anderson was eventually fired for 
failing to follow his supervisor’s order to stop seeing Lewis outside of the 
office.131 
Like Gersen and Suk’s DOE example, these two cases demonstrate the 
persistence of sexual regulation in the post-Lawrence era, and again show how 
administrative discipline can be functionally very similar to its criminal analog. 
121. 528 F.3d 762 (10th Cir. 2008). 
122. 371 F.3d 879 (6th Cir. 2004). 
123. 528 F.3d at 764. 
124. Id. at 765. 
125. Id. 
126. Id. at 766. 
127. Anderson, 371 F.3d at 880. 
128. Id. 
129. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Chief of Police Howard Morris).
130. Id. at 882. 
131. Id. at 880. 
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Johnson’s and Anderson’s employers reiterated, albeit in more muted tones, the 
kind of normative condemnation that we associate with pre-Lawrence criminal 
law. Further, these cases also suggest the crucial importance of administrative 
methods and venues outside of the DOE and other federal agencies. As more 
and more scholars of administrative law and history are beginning to note, the 
American administrative state is vast and we should not ignore its state and 
local tendrils.132 These, after all, are the sites of many Americans’ most 
frequent contact with the state. 
* * *
In providing this more complete account of the “bureaucratic turn”—its 
longer arc, its wider sweep—we are not so much questioning Gersen and Suk’s 
findings as supplementing them with evidence that the authors may not have 
considered. The result, we hope, is to underscore one of their key points: In its 
current form, the administrative regulation of sexuality is at odds with the ethic 
of sexual liberalism that Lawrence represents. Americans may have bought into 
the principles of sexual liberty and privacy undergirding Lawrence, but that 
does not mean the state treats these principles as sacrosanct. Indeed, we see the 
opposite. 
If we are correct about the timing and scale of the “bureaucratic turn,” the 
problem is in fact even more significant than Gersen and Suk suggest. A 
modern sex bureaucracy that includes a range of federal, state, and local 
bureaucracies, rather than simply one pocket of the federal administrative state, 
has a vast cache of regulatory tools and agents at its disposal. Gersen and Suk 
have begun to illuminate the world of federal grants and subsidies, where 
federal agencies may leverage the power of the purse to promote their 
132. For recent historical work, see, for example, PASCOE, supra note 18; LEVENSTEIN, supra 
note 80; TRACY STEFFES, SCHOOL, SOCIETY, & STATE: A NEW EDUCATION TO GOVERN MODERN 
AMERICA, 1890–1940 (2012); BRIAN BALOGH, THE ASSOCIATIONAL STATE: AMERICAN 
GOVERNANCE IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY (2015); Sara Mayeux, What Gideon Did, 116 COLUM. L. 
REV. 15 (2016); TANI, supra note 71; Marie Amelie-George, Agency Nullification: Defying Bans on 
Gay and Lesbian Foster and Adoptive Parents, 51 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 363 (2016). The Pascoe, 
Levenstein, and George cites bear particular note here, because of their salience to sexual regulation. 
For recent work in administrative law, see, for example, Jessica Bulman-Pozen & Heather K. Gerken, 
Uncooperative Federalism, 118 YALE L. J. 1256 (2009); Abbe R. Gluck, Intrastatutory Federalism 
and Statutory Interpretation: State Implementation of Federal Law in Health Reform and Beyond, 121 
YALE L. J. 534 (2011); Miriam Seifter, States, Agencies, and Legitimacy, 67 VAND. L. REV. 443 
(2014); Elizabeth Chambliss & Dana Remus, Nothing Could Be Finer? The Role of Agency General 
Counsel in North and South Carolina, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 2039 (2016). The history we have 
recounted here suggests the value of even more research in the Chambliss and Remus vein, 
investigating the regulatory work of state and local agencies apart from their important role in 
administering federal law. See, e.g., Michael Asminow, The Fourth Reform: Introduction to the 
Administrative Law Review Symposium on State Administrative Law, 53 ADMIN. L. REV. 395 (2001) 
(a symposium on state administrative law). 
146 CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW ONLINE Vol.  7:122 
regulatory agendas.133 What we have emphasized in this Section is that, in 
addition to the power of the purse and other tools common to federal regulatory 
agencies, the sex bureaucracy may deploy other powerful tools, including 
professional codes of conduct, employee grievance procedures, and the like. 
Insulated from public scrutiny, these, too, may be used to enforce a particular 
vision of normative sexuality, and they may reach populations well beyond 
those living and working on college and university campuses. 
III. 
AFFIRMATIVE CONSENT AS THE NEW MARRIAGE? SEXUAL REGULATION’S 
NEOLIBERAL FORM 
The thrust of our argument so far has been to underscore the importance 
of studying the sex bureaucracy, including the evolution of its scope and logic. 
In doing so, we risk downplaying the novelty of Gersen and Suk’s findings. 
But having canvassed the “old sex bureaucracy” and offered a more complete 
portrait of the new, we can now emphasize what is most insightful and 
interesting about the regulatory work that Gersen and Suk have described. In 
our view, their most important contribution is neither their identification of a 
“bureaucratic turn” nor their sharp condemnation of the DOE, but rather their 
illumination of what appears to be a fundamental shift in the government’s 
rationale for sexual regulation, in and outside of the administrative state. 
Historically, as Gersen and Suk note, marriage marked the boundary 
between legal and illegal sex. “Good sex” occurred in the marital bed; “bad 
sex” happened outside of it.134 Indeed, some laws implied that “bad sex” was 
all but impossible within marriage;135 some law enforcement practices 
133. Grants-in-aid often appear to be a relatively innocuous policy-making tool, but their 
regulatory power should not be understated. See generally MARTHA DERTHICK, THE INFLUENCE OF 
FEDERAL GRANTS: PUBLIC ASSISTANCE IN MASSACHUSETTS (1970); Eloise Pasachoff, Agency 
Enforcement of Spending Clause Statutes: A Defense of the Funding Cut-Off, 124 YALE L. J. 248 
(2014); TANI, supra note 71. 
134. Gersen & Suk, supra note 1 at 888; see also Murray, supra note 17, at 1268 (discussing 
marriage’s place as “licensed locus for sexual activity”); Murray, supra note 16, at 12 (discussing “a 
social system that cordoned off marriage as the licensed locus of sexual expression”); JOHN D’EMILIO 
& ESTELLE B. FREEDMAN, INTIMATE MATTERS: A HISTORY OF SEXUALITY IN AMERICA 16 (2d ed. 
1997) (noting prohibitions on sex were not intended to “squelch sexual expression, but rather to 
channel it into what they considered to be its proper setting . . . marriage”); FRIEDMAN, supra note 
113, at 127 (discussing marriage’s place as the approved site for sexual activity); MORRIS PLOSCOWE, 
SEX AND THE LAW 1 (1951) (“Only in marriage is sex expression socially and legally acceptable. The 
jailer and the social censor cast their shadow across non-marital and extra-marital sexual behavior.”); 
Dubler, supra note 34, at 777 (“Marriage, in other words, was the core legal site for licit sex.”); 
HENDRIK HARTOG, MAN AND WIFE IN AMERICA: A HISTORY 285 (2005) (noting that well into the 
1950s, “[m]arriage, or at least the promise of marriage, was the usual precondition for sexual 
relations”). 
135. We refer here to the lack of legal protection against forcible sexual encounters within 
marriage. See Jill Elaine Hasday, Contest and Consent: A Legal History of Marital Rape, 88 CALIF. L. 
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suggested that marriage could alter, as if by alchemy, the character of prior 
sexual encounters.136 The legal liberalization of sex that has occurred over the 
last fifty years has complicated matters. As lawmakers, judges, and prosecutors 
invalidated or ignored criminal prohibitions on nonmarital sex, marriage’s 
utility as a boundary marker diminished.137 
Recognizing the important work that marriage performed in the past, 
scholars have wondered what, if anything, would emerge to fill the vacuum.138 
Gersen and Suk identify the emergence of “an alternative marker”: violence or 
subordination in the commission of the sexual conduct at issue. They also 
identify the characteristic that now distinguishes appropriate sexual conduct 
from inappropriate violence or subordination: consent (or lack thereof). As 
Gersen and Suk explain, if one party to the sexual conduct at issue does not or 
cannot consent, the sexual conduct is presumptively impermissible.139 
To be clear, Gersen and Suk are not saying that the DOE caused this shift, 
or that the shift occurred during the relatively short time span of the DOE’s 
campaign against sexual assault on college campuses. They are aware that a 
broader project of sexual liberalization, underway for decades, did much to 
bring consent to the fore of conversations about what constitutes lawful and 
unlawful sex and sexuality.140 But in paying such close attention to the work of 
REV. 1373 (2000); Reva B. Siegel, “The Rule of Love”: Wife Beating as Prerogative and Privacy, 105 
YALE L.J. 2117 (1996). 
136. Dubler, Immoral Purposes, supra note 34, at 776–78; Stephen Robertson, Making Right a 
Girl’s Ruin: Working-Class Legal Cultures and Forced Marriage in New York City, 1890-1950, 36 J. 
AM. STUDIES 199 (2002); Stephen Robertson, Seduction, Sexual Violence, and Marriage in New York 
City, 1886–1955, 24 L. & HIST. REV. 331 (2006). 
137. Gersen & Suk, supra note 1, at 888; see also Melissa Murray, The Space Between: The 
Cooperative Regulation of Criminal Law and Family Law, 44 FAM. L.Q. 227, 239–40 (2010). 
138. Murray, supra note 17, at 1302–04 (discussing possibilities for sexual regulation after 
Lawrence); Murray, supra note 16, at 60–61 (discussing the post-Lawrence landscape); Katherine M. 
Franke, Longing for Loving, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 2685, 2685–87 (2008) (considering the absence of 
regulation after Lawrence). 
139. Gersen & Suk, supra note 1, at 889. On the emergence of consent as a defining feature of 
the modern landscape of sexual regulation, see also JOSEPH J. FISCHEL, SEX AND HARM IN THE AGE 
OF CONSENT 6–7 (2016) (identifying “(non)consent as the gravamen adjudicating sexual harm” and 
asking if “our nationally privileged sexuality” has shifted from heterosexuality to “adult 
consensuality”); Stephen J. Schulhofer, Consent: What It Means and Why It’s Time to Require It, 47 
U. PAC. REV. 665, 665–66 (2016) (“[T]he unmistakable trend in the recent legislation, jurisprudence, 
and academic writing is to the effect that, as the FBI definition now puts it, rape is ‘[sexual] 
penetration without consent.’”); Judith Shulevitz, Regulating Sex, N.Y. TIMES (June 27, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/28/opinion/sunday/judith-shulevitz-regulating-sex.html (discussing 
the rise of affirmative consent and the American Law Institute’s recent effort to integrate affirmative 
consent into the Model Penal Code). 
140. We also recognize that for some American adults, the boundary-drawing mechanisms of 
marriage and consent have never been as distinct as we portray them here. Persons perceived as 
disabled have often found themselves doubly sexually regulated—by laws restricting their access to 
marriage and by laws deeming them unable to consent to sexual contact. On disability and access to 
marriage, see Rabia Belt, Disability: The Last Marriage Equality Frontier (Stan. Pub. Law, Working 
Paper No. 2653117, 2015), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2653117. On disability 
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the DOE, Gersen and Suk move the ball forward, prompting us to reflect on the 
concrete implications of the shift towards consent. Whether on college 
campuses or in the world outside the ivory tower, what does it mean for 
marriage to be “out” and consent to be “in”? 
Consider, first, how marriage operated as a boundary-drawing 
mechanism. When marriage marked the line between lawful and unlawful sex, 
the relevant determination was whether the parties were bound by a state-
recognized marriage. This was not always an easy determination,141 but once 
made, all sexual conduct fell into neat and tidy boxes. Generally speaking, if 
the parties were validly married, their sexual conduct was presumptively 
lawful, even if violent and coercive.142 If, on the other hand, the parties were 
not validly married, their sexual interactions were de facto illicit.143 With 
marriage as the lodestar, sexual regulation was relatively straightforward and 
efficient. 
The determination of consent is considerably more difficult. For many 
decades now, marriage in the United States has been a public, documented, and 
easily recognized status. Entry into marriage is often celebrated, in front of 
many witnesses; licenses are signed and filed at city hall. By contrast, the 
giving of consent, especially with regard to sex, often occurs in private and is 
often communicated in terms that are implicit rather than explicit, creating the 
possibility of conflicting interpretations. 
Complicating matters further, unlike a marriage-based system, a consent-
based system of sexual regulation requires treating each sexual interaction as a 
separate transaction for which consent must be secured. Two persons might 
happily engage in sexual conduct on one occasion, but on another occasion, 
one or more parties might find that same conduct undesirable. In short, a 
consent-based regime of sexual regulation leaves the line between licit and 
illicit sex unstable and perpetually subject to individual negotiation. 
and legal capacity to consent, see Alexander A. Boni-Saenz, Sexuality and Incapacity, 76 OHIO ST. L. 
J. 1201 (2015). 
141. See, e.g., Ariela Dubler, Wifely Behavior: A Legal History of Acting Married, 100 COLUM. 
L. REV. 957 (2000); Kerry Abrams, Marriage Fraud, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 1 (2012); ANGELA 
ONWUACHI-WILLIG, ACCORDING TO OUR HEARTS: RHINELANDER V. RHINELANDER AND THE LAW OF 
THE MULTIRACIAL FAMILY (2013). 
142. People v. Liberta, 474 N.E.2d 567, 571 (N.Y. 1984) (discussing the marital rape 
exemption). 
143. Anne M. Coughlin, Sex and Guilt, 84 VA. L. REV. 1, 6 (1998) (observing that sexuality 
was once considered a “a force so dangerous that it could not safely be left to self-regulation, but rather 
should be closely confined, by state law, within marital relationships”); JOHN D’EMILIO & ESTELLE B. 
FREEDMAN, INTIMATE MATTERS: A HISTORY OF SEXUALITY IN AMERICA 27–38 (1988) (stating that 
laws against nonmarital sexuality were vigorously enforced in the colonies, carrying “harsh penalties” 
for both men and women and punishing “[e]ven behaviors that might lead to sex outside marriage”); 
see also ROLLIN M. PERKINS & RONALD N. BOYCE, CRIMINAL LAW 454–56 (3d ed. 1982) (tracing 
the historical development of the crimes of adultery and fornication). 
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For some women’s rights advocates and others who have fought for 
victims of sexual assault, this kind of disaggregation and instability is a good 
thing, or at least an improvement over the alternative. A consent framework 
sees women as autonomous individuals, untethered to their sexual pasts and 
relationships. As Joseph Fischel explains, in the context of rape, a consent 
framework does not interpret a woman’s sexual encounters as a potential 
“violation of one man’s property (daughter or wife) by another man,” but rather 
focuses on the intentions of “a rights-bearing person.”144 
Whatever one’s view, however, the crucial question is how a consent 
framework operates in practice. This is where Gersen and Suk’s article is most 
illuminating. The DOE, they assert, has encouraged institutions to embrace a 
specific understanding of what counts as consent: affirmative, verbal 
agreement.145 Fearing the wrath of the state as regulator, institutions have 
pushed further, toward not only affirmative agreement but also enthusiasm and 
excitement in the articulation of consent.146 The DOE, they note, has also urged 
specific procedures for identifying nonconsensual sexual encounters in the 
event that one party feels aggrieved. One hallmark of these procedures, Gersen 
144. FISCHEL, supra note 139, at 10. Relatedly, a consent rubric also shifts the focus from 
whether one party imposed physical force on the other party (a traditional element of the crime of rape, 
and one that often worked to the disadvantage of victims) to whether both parties agreed to the sexual 
encounter. Michelle J. Anderson, Campus Sexual Assault Adjudication and Resistance to Reform, 125 
YALE L. J. 1940, 1951 (2016). We have offered just a taste of a large literature on sexual violence and 
consent. On consent more generally—its nature, its significance—we also note a vast literature in 
political theory (a literature that we do not attempt to capture here). 
145. Gersen & Suk, supra note 1, at 924–31. To be clear, the DOE has never purported to 
require that colleges and universities adopt affirmative consent policies. It has, however, defined 
“sexual violence” to refer to “physical sexual acts perpetrated against a person’s will or where a 
person is incapable of giving consent due to the victim’s use of drugs or alcohol,” and it has instructed 
regulated entities to “take immediate and effective steps to end sexual harassment and sexual 
violence.” OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., DEAR COLLEAGUE LETTER, supra note 
7, at 1 (emphasis added), 2. In informal guidance, the DOE has also “recommended” that institutions 
provide students with sexual violence training that includes “the school’s definition of consent . . . , 
including examples.” OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS 
ON TITLE IX AND SEXUAL VIOLENCE, 2014, available at 
http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/qa-201404-title-ix.pdf (last accessed Oct. 3, 2016). 
Eager to stay on the right side of the law, institutions have understandably been drawn toward 
affirmative consent policies. See Janet Halley, The Move Toward Affirmative Consent, SIGNS (2015), 
http://signsjournal.org/currents-affirmative-consent/halley/ (last accessed Aug. 22, 2016) (noting the 
appearance of affirmative consent requirements in campus sexual conduct codes and “in a parallel 
campaign for reform of state-based criminal law”); Sandy Keenan. Affirmative Consent: Are Students 
Really Asking? N.Y. TIMES (July 28, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/02/education/edlife/affirmative-consent-are-students-really-
asking.html (reporting that approximately 1,400 institutions of higher education now use an 
affirmative consent standard in their sexual assault policies). 
146. Gersen & Suk, supra note 1, at 931; see also Janet Napolitano, “Only Yes Means Yes”: An 
Essay on University Policies Regarding Sexual Violence and Sexual Assault, 33 YALE L. & POLICY 
REV. 387, 389–90 (2014) (explaining why the University of California adopted an affirmative consent 
policy, six months before state law required it to do so). 
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and Suk explain, is that they invite parties to give different meanings to their 
encounter. Another hallmark is that they make ambiguity entirely consistent 
with a finding of sexual assault. For those who wish to avoid any allegation of 
impropriety, the implication is clear: affirmative, enthusiastic consent is the 
safest path.147 
As for why the DOE’s current regulatory framework has privileged 
affirmative consent, part of the answer is surely a grassroots “yes means yes” 
movement, led by a younger generation of activists seeking to transform 
societal approaches to sex and empower female sexuality. But note how nicely 
affirmative consent coheres with the practices of modern bureaucracy. In much 
the same way that banks, schools, hospitals, and other regulated institutions are 
required to maintain records that authorities might review at a later date, 
college students are urged to practice sexual record-keeping, so to speak, in the 
form of securing clear, lucid assurances of affirmative consent from sexual 
partners and also of registering their own manifestations of enthusiastic 
consent. These “records,” in turn, make it easier for regulators, adjudicators, 
and enforcers to later determine whether the line between licit and illicit sex 
has been crossed. There are, of course, enormous differences between the 
affirmative consent requirements that have emerged from the administrative 
enforcement of Title IX and the actual record-keeping requirements imposed 
on other regulated institutions, and by drawing this analogy we do not intend to 
imply that affirmative consent standards are anything less than good-faith 
efforts to prevent sexual assault. Our point is that the model of consent that the 
DOE has advanced has a decidedly bureaucratic cast, training the subjects of 
regulation to seek and voice consent in specific, cognizable, and ultimately 
documentable ways. 
For Gersen and Suk, these observations would likely only lend urgency to 
their warnings about the bureaucratization of sex and the more general 
phenomenon of “bureaucratic creep.” If consent has become as important as we 
and other observers believe, should we not worry about unelected bureaucrats 
exercising such significant authority over what consent is and how it is 
established?148 
147. Gersen & Suk, supra note 1, at 931–46. 
148. We phrase Gersen and Suk’s concern as a question because we think that it actually is an 
open question. As Gersen and Suk note, anti-democratic decision making is a real concern in the DOE 
example, because of the dearth of opportunities for formal public comment and the limited possibility 
of judicial review. Gersen & Suk, supra note 1, at 908–11. But these are not the only mechanisms for 
public influence on administrative decision making. Indeed, the DOE’s campaign against sexual 
violence on college campuses might be viewed not as anti-democratic bureaucratization, but rather as 
a direct response to what some at least one commentator has labeled a “new civil rights movement,” 
comprised of survivors of gender-based violence and their allies. Nancy Chi Cantalupo, For the Title 
IX Civil Rights Movement: Congratulations and Cautions, 125 YALE L.J. F. 281 (2016). For 
journalistic coverage of grassroots activism and its relationship to the DOE’s efforts, see, for example, 
Lisa W. Foderaro, At Yale, Sharper Look at Treatment for Women, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 7, 2011), 
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To this valid question, we add two broader ones: Setting to one side 
whether the shift toward consent represents progress in women’s long fight 
against sexual violence, what does it mean to live in a society where consent—
and more specifically, affirmative consent—may be the new marriage? And 
what might this trend suggest about the broader regime of governance under 
which we live? These questions are difficult and warrant sustained scholarly 
attention. In the interest of furthering the conversation that Gersen and Suk 
have initiated, we offer a few tentative observations. 
As a number of scholars have noted, consent is an essential feature of 
contract; contract, in turn, is at the heart of classical liberalism.149 This 
ideology imagines the good society as one in which sovereign, self-governing 
individuals pursue their interests—and thereby achieve their just deserts—via 
private ordering; the state’s role is limited to that of a neutral “nightwatchman,” 
there to ensure that private agreements are honored but otherwise fading into 
the background.150 A consent-based system of sexual regulation would thus 
appear to amplify and promote the values that classical liberalism seeks to 
advance and protect, including individualism, autonomy, liberty, and freedom 
from government paternalism. For many Americans, this would be a good 
thing, at least in the realm of sex. 
But does the move toward consent actually insulate Americans from 
undue state interference? Under this new regime of sexual regulation, few 
sexual encounters are presumptively permissible or impermissible; the 
legitimacy of every encounter turns on consent. But even (and perhaps 
especially) in this “yes means yes” era, expressions of consent are subject to 
interpretation, and thus disagreement—which in turn creates opportunities for 
the state to intervene. In the Title IX context, Gersen and Suk note, the college 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/08/nyregion/08yale.html; Vanessa Grigoriadis, Meet the College 
Women Who Are Starting a Revolution Against Campus Sexual Assault, N.Y. MAG. (Sept. 21, 2014), 
http://nymag.com/thecut/2014/09/emma-sulkowicz-campus-sexual-assault-activism.html; Caroline 
Heldman & Danielle Dirks, Blowing the Whistle on Campus Rape, MS., Winter 2014, at 32, 32–37. If 
we take this grassroots activism seriously, the sex bureaucracy might very well be an expression of 
popular will. And if the sex bureaucracy does reflect popular will, perhaps the more pressing concern, 
from an administrative law perspective, is accountability: Who is ultimately responsible for the 
administration of the sex bureaucracy? And if we can say with certainty who is responsible, do all 
relevant stakeholders share that knowledge? 
149. See, e.g., MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870–1960: 
THE CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY, 33 (1992) (“[T]he institution of contract . . . represented the legal 
expression of free market principles.”); Christopher Waldrep, Law and Society: Structuring Legal 
Revolutions, 1870–1920, 5 J. GILDED AGE & PROGRESSIVE ERA 309, 316 (2006) (referring to contract 
as “the legal articulation of classical liberalism”). 
150. In American history, classical liberalism enjoyed its heyday in law and policy during the 
decades bracketing the turn of the twentieth century. For examples of how deeply this ideology 
pervaded American life and legal thought, see HOWARD GILLMAN, THE CONSTITUTION BESIEGED: 
THE RISE AND DEMISE OF LOCHNER ERA POLICE POWERS JURISPRUDENCE (1994); AMY DRU 
STANLEY, FROM BONDAGE TO CONTRACT: WAGE LABOR, MARRIAGE, AND THE MARKET IN THE 
AGE OF SLAVE EMANCIPATION (1998). 
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and university administrators acting in the DOE’s shadow determine whether 
consent has been secured or whether the boundary has been breached. This 
stands in stark contrast to a status- or marriage-based regime of sexual 
regulation. As feminist scholars have long noted, marriage is a public 
institution with a private valence.151 Once individuals married, the states’ role 
in their affairs was sharply circumscribed—for better or for worse.152 Where 
there was an intact marriage, the state was loath to cross the threshold.153 
Where is the threshold in a consent-based regime? It does not exist. 
If this argument strikes readers as ironic, it should. The face of consent, 
particularly affirmative consent, is profoundly libertarian. How can a consent-
based regime of sexual regulation be as statist as we suggest? In this seeming 
paradox lies the most important insight to be gained from Gersen and Suk’s 
article, for this is the very same paradox that scholars have identified in 
neoliberalism itself. 
We deploy the word “neoliberalism” with caution, acknowledging that it 
has become a tempting “shorthand for ‘everything [we] think is wrong and 
horrible.’”154 Used carefully, however, the word still captures better than any 
other a particular “political rationality”—one that has deeply marked American 
governance for the last forty-some years.155 To paraphrase David Harvey, 
neoliberalism is at bottom a theory about how to best advance human well-
being—a theory based on the idea of “maximiz[ing]” “entrepreneurial 
freedoms” within a framework of “private property rights, individual liberty, 
unencumbered markets, and free trade.”156 It extends a market logic to all 
realms—that is, not only to the actual buying and selling of goods and labor, 
151. See, e.g., Jana B. Singer, The Privatization of Family Law, 1992 WIS. L. REV. 1443, 1512 
(noting the duality of marriage as a both a “public institution” and a “private relationship”); NANCY F. 
COTT, PUBLIC VOWS: A HISTORY OF MARRIAGE AND THE NATION (2002) (documenting the many 
ways in which marriage has served as a “pillar of the state,” despite common perceptions that marriage 
is a private matter). 
152. On the “worse” side of the equation, see Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Violence of Privacy, 
23 CONN. L. REV. 973, 974 (1991) (“Historically, male battering of women was untouched by law, 
protected as part of the private sphere of family life.”). 
153. For the sake of our argument, we have painted with broad brushstrokes here. For a more 
nuanced description of the state’s role in regulating the behavior of married parties, see Elizabeth Katz, 
Judicial Patriarchy and Domestic Violence: A Challenge to the Conventional Family Privacy 
Narrative, 21 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & LAW 379 (2015). 
154. Dag Einar Thorsen, The Neoliberal Challenge: What Is Neoliberalism? 2 CONTEMP. 
READINGS L. & SOC. JUST. 188, 206 (2010). 
155. Wendy Brown, American Nightmare: Neoliberalism, Neoconservatism, and De-
Democratization, 34 POL. THEORY 690, 693 (2006); see also DAVID HARVEY, A BRIEF HISTORY OF 
NEOLIBERALISM (2005). 
156. David Harvey, Neoliberalism as Creative Destruction, 610 ANNALS AM. ACADEMY POL. 
& SOC. SCI. 22, 22 (2007). 
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but to the education of children, the policing of crime, the provision of public 
infrastructure, and the relief of poverty.157 
Proponents of neoliberal policies often emphasize the importance of 
keeping the government out—of letting the market do its work, as if the market 
existed apart from the state. Of course, it does not and never has.158 
Neoliberalism requires a state that creates and protects its preferred institutional 
framework.159 It also relies on the state to define citizenship in a particular 
way—namely, with an emphasis on assuming individual responsibility and 
pursuing self-sufficiency via “active engagement with the world of work.”160 In 
the United States, at least, entrenching this particular definition of citizenship 
has required heavy-handed government policies, ranging from complicated 
schemes of “workfare” to the expansion of carceral apparatuses. In short, 
neoliberalism is anti-statist in principle, but deeply statist in practice.161 
By illuminating the same paradox in the realm of sexual regulation, 
Gersen and Suk help us to see how deeply neoliberalism has pervaded 
American governance. It has now captured realms—such as civil rights 
enforcement—that we tend to associate with a very different political 
rationality (that of modern or “New Deal” liberalism). Our challenge, going 
forward, is not only to interrogate the latest instantiation of our “sex 
bureaucracy,” but also to interrogate the neoliberal order of which it is a part. 
CONCLUSION 
As we hope this response has made clear, The Sex Bureaucracy is an 
invaluable and timely article, filled with insights into administrative behavior, 
institutional responses, and shifting sexual norms. Although we have 
questioned the authors’ portrait of the modern sex bureaucracy and its 
157. Sanford Schram, et al., The Third Level of US Welfare Reform: Governmentality Under 
Neoliberal Paternalism, 14 CITIZENSHIP STUD. 739, 742 (2010); Brown, supra note 155, at 694. 
158. Frances E. Olsen, The Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal Reform, 96 
HARV. L. REV. 1497 (1983); BERNARD E. HARCOURT, THE ILLUSION OF FREE MARKETS: 
PUNISHMENT AND THE MYTH OF NATURAL ORDER (2011). 
159. Harvey, supra note 156, at 22. 
160. Andrew Woolford & Amanda Nelund, The Responsibilities of the Poor: Performing 
Neoliberal Citizenship Within the Bureaucratic Field, 87 SOC. SERV. REV. 292, 293 (2013); see also 
Martha T. McCluskey, Efficiency and Social Citizenship: Challenging the Neoliberal Attack on the 
Welfare State, 78 IND. L. J. 783, 786 (2003) (“In this vision, citizens’ primary role is to maximize their 
private rational self-interest as buyers and sellers in market exchanges.”); Brown, supra note 155, at 
694 (noting that neoliberalism measures citizens’ “moral autonomy” by “their capacity for ‘self-
care’”). 
161. See Miguel A. Centeno & Joseph N. Cohen, The Arc of Neoliberalism, 38 ANN. REV. 
SOCIOL. 317, 325 (2012) (noting that although neoliberalism valorizes limited government, neoliberal 
reformers have rarely chosen to shrink the size of the state “in any substantial, absolute sense”); Loïc 
Wacquant, Crafting the Neoliberal State: Workfare, Prisonfare, and Social Insecurity, 25 SOC. F. 197, 
214 (2010) (observing that while the neoliberal state “embraces laissez-faire at the top, . . . it is 
anything but laissez-faire at the bottom”). 
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relationship to the regulatory efforts that preceded it, we agree with many of 
their core concerns and indeed have marshaled additional evidence to support 
them. Most notably, we agree that when it comes to regulating sex and 
sexuality, government bureaucrats have at their disposal sophisticated tools and 
multiple levers of power, and that we have every reason to worry about 
inequality in the operation of these tools and levers. As contemporary scholars 
and policymakers develop normative conclusions about particular slices of the 
sex bureaucracy, we hope that our holistic and historical account will join 
Gersen and Suk’s important article in informing that work. 
Indeed, our greatest aspiration for this response is that it will encourage 
more scholars to follow in Gersen and Suk’s footsteps, building an ever-more 
nuanced picture of the quotidian ways in which the state regulates the intimate 
lives of its subjects, and thus an ever-more robust empirical basis for normative 
claims and policy proposals. Sexual regulation, Gersen and Suk helpfully 
remind us, is not an artifact of a morals-obsessed Victorian age, but a crucial 
aspect of modern American governance. Celebratory narratives of sexual 
liberation, such as those contained in canonical Supreme Court opinions, too 
often lull us into missing this point, by encouraging us to mistake formal 
promises of liberty for a system of governance that is so restrained and 
chastened as to merit little critical attention. Regardless of whether one’s views 
on bureaucracy and sexuality align with Gersen and Suk’s, this complacency 
comes at a cost. It is the cost of missing opportunities to shape and contest the 
forces that will structure some of our most personal and meaningful choices. 
